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INTERPRETING THIS CONSTITUTION: 
THE UNHELPFUL CONTRIBUTIONS OF SPECIAL 
THEORIES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
WILLIAM vAN ALsTYNE* 
The United States has an aged Constitution. In fact, among the world's 
extant constitutions, ours is the oldest of those that are both written and 
judicially enforceable as supreme law. Most Americans, growing up under the 
presuppositions of how our own Constitution operates, may well assume that 
it merely reflects a commonplace feature of government. But that assumption 
is inaccurate. Even now, the world's general practice is contrary to our own. 
Indeed, a great deal of our early constitutional law that is so much taken for 
granted at home is more carefully studied in other countries that have only 
recently modified their own basic legal arrangements in partial imitation of 
the American constitutional plan. In India, Japan, and West Germany, for 
instance, early American Supreme Court decisions (such as Marbury v. 
Madison,! which confirmed the authority of the Supreme Court to refuse to 
apply acts of Congress which in its view are not consistent with the Constitu-
tion), are studied ·with keen interest because somewhat equivalent powers have 
been vested in their judiciaries only during the last forty years.2 In England, 
which even now resists suggestions to entrench a written Constitution or a Bill 
of Rights,3 the manner in which the United States Supreme Court has 
historically exercised its stewardship in constitutional adjudications is also of 
very modern interest. It fuels the English debate on both sides of controversy;4 
•Perkins Professor of Law, Duke University. The Dunwody Distinguished Lecture in Law 
was presented on Friday, March 18, 1983 at the University of Florida, College of Law, Gaines-
ville, Florida. 
1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
2. Medicus, Federal Republic of Germany, in 1 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CoM· 
PARATIVE LAw F1, F3; Jeani, India, id. at IIO; Noda, Japan, id. at J8. 
3. Lloyd, Do We Need a Bill of Rights?, 39 MoD. L. REv. 121, 124 (1976). See generally 
Griffith, The Political Constitution, 42 MoD. L. REv. 1 (1979). 
4. The current law in England is still as it was in 1700 in this respect: "An Act of 
Parliament can do no wrong, though it may do several things that look pretty odd." City of 
London v. Wood, 88 Eng. Rep. 1592, 1602 (1700). "In Britain, the phrase 'judicial review' is 
merely a flattering way of describing statutory interpretation- the judicial approach to 
which it is confined by strict rules, though there are signs in recent cases of a more liberal 
approach developing." Scarman, Fundamental Rights, The British Scene, 78 CoLuM. L REv. 
1575, 1585 (1978). See also Karst, Judicial Review and the Channel Tunnel, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 
447 (1980). 
For a review of legal developments in New Zealand, respecting freedom of the press, see 
EssAYs ON HUMAN RIGHTS (9th ed. K. Keith, ed. 1968); Burrows, The Law and the Press, 4 
OTAGO L. REv. 119 (1978). For a review in Australia, see E. CAMPBELL &: H. WHITMORE, 
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some influential persons utilize certain United States Supreme Court decisions 
to illustrate the wisdom of providing similar protections in England, while a 
larger number utilize other decisions which, in their opinion, show the un-
wisdom and untrustworthiness of such judicial power. 
A great deal of the hesitancy in other countries to entrench within their own 
government an independent judiciary with powers of constitutional super-
intendence such as those possessed by our Supreme Court, reflects an am-
bivalence still not entirely laid to rest even in the United States. Essentially, 
it is an ambivalence that such provisions of fundamental law as are worthy of 
being placed beyond simple majoritarian tampering in a Constitution must 
necessarily be cast in language that nevertheless requires interpretation. But 
insofar as virtually no amount of editorial precaution can fully ensure against 
subsequent judicial misconstructions that may grow out of mere judicial hubris 
(or out of impatience for appropriate constitution'll change through amend-
ment), there is an anxiety that entrenching fundamen.al law is not well ad-
vised. The judiciary cannot be trusted. The point is very old and equally new. 
In England, it takes the form of doubting the wisdom of confiding to judges 
a power to hem in Parliament by irreversible interpretations of proposed 
fundamental-law clauses which class-biased judges might construe (or mis-
construe) in favor of the propertied classes. It is a concern derived partly from 
observations about the United States Supreme Court and its uses of the due pro-
cess clause during the "Lochner" era, i.e., that period during which a very large 
number of state statutes were held invalid as depriving entrepreneurs of 
"liberty" of "property" without "due" process.5 In the United States, it is 
equally well represenled at the other extreme by the arguments of Alexander 
Hamilton who dismissed the desire to include a Bill of Rights within the pro-
posed Constitution of 1787. Here, the objection was that the effort would be 
misleading and insufficient because, however a free speech or free press clause 
might be framed, the definitional latitude available to courts (as available also 
to Congress) would tolerate wholesale "evasion": 
What is the liberty of the press? Who can give it any definition which 
would not leave the utmost latitude for evasion? I hold it to be impractic-
able; and from this I infer, that its security, whatever fine declarations 
may be inserted in any constitution respecting it, must altogether depend 
on public opinion, and on the general spirit of the people and of the 
government. And here, after all, as intimated upon another occasion, 
must we seek for the only solid basis of all our rights.6 
FREEDOM IN AuSTRALIA (1973). Set~ also Hunt 8: McCarthy, Why No First Amendment? The 
Role of the Press in Relationship to justice, in AM./Au>rL./N.Z. L. 133, 147 (1980). 
The background to the newly entrenched Canadian Bill of Rights is presented in Tarno-
polsky, The Historical and Constitutional Context of the Proposed Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedom, 44 LAw 8: CoNTEMP. PRoBs. 169 (1981), and an assessment of the most 
recent changes are presented in Reshaping Confederation: The 1982 Reform of the Canadian 
Constitution, 45 LAW 8: CONTEM. PROBS. 1 (1983). 
5. The reference is, of course, to Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The large 
number of related decisions are summarized in B. WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 173-75 (1942) and in the Constitution of the United States (G.P.O. 1972). 
6. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 514-15 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). For a modern 
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Nonetheless, at the time Hamilton expressed his own skepticism, the more 
moderate optimism shared by both Thomas Jefferson and James Madison pre-
vailed, although each readily conceded the inconclusiveness of a Bill of Rights. 
Indeed, their own observations were extremely measured. Jefferson suggested: 
The declaration of rights, is, like all other human blessings, alloyed with 
some inconveniences, and not accomplishing fully its object. . . . But 
though it is not absolutely efficacious under all circumstances, it is of 
great potency always, and rarely inefficacious. A brace the more will often 
keep up the building which would have fallen, with that brace the less.7 
Similarly, writing to Jefferson less than a year before he introduced into 
Congress his own draft of a Bill of Rights, Madison quite mildly observed: "I 
have favored it because I suppose it might be of use, and if properly executed 
could not be of disservice."8 Addressing the House of Representatives, Madison 
reflected the same sensible diffidence: 
I will own that I never considered this provlSlon so essential to the 
Federal Constitution as to make it improper to ratify it, until such an 
amendment was added; at the same time, I always conceived, that in a 
certain form, and to a certain extent, such a provision was neither im-
proper nor altogether useless. 9 
Then, adverting to the expectation of judicial responsibility to apply the pro-
posed Bill of Rights in the normal course of adjudication, Madison noted: "If 
they are incorporated into the Constitution, independent tribunals of justice 
'\vill consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of these rights."lo 
Madison's own notes, jotted down to guide him in this extemporaneous address 
in Congress, summed up the matter: "Bill of Rights - useful not es-
sential •.•• " 11 
These were modest and quite unexceptionable expectations. They did not 
view that Hamilton may have been correct in his skepticism, see Kurland, The Irrelevance 
of the Constitution: The First Amendment's Freedom of Speech and Freedom of Press Clauses, 
29 DRAKE L. REv. I, 5-6 (1979-80). And for more general statements respecting the ultimate 
undependability of judicial review to secure the Bill of Rights, see, e.g., R. JAcKSON, THE 
SUPREME CoURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 80 (1955) ("I know of no modem 
instance in which any judiciary has saved a whole people from the great currents of in-
tolerance, passion, usurpation, and tyranny which have threatened liberty and free institu-
tions.'1; THE SPIRIT OF LmERTY, PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 189 (I. Dillard, ed. 
1953) ("I often wonder whether we do not rest our hopes too much upon constitutions, upon 
laws and upon courts.'1. 
7. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, from Paris (Mar. 15, 1789), reprinted 
in part in THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS ]EFFERSON 462, 462-63 (A. Koch 8: 
W. Peden eds. 1944). 
8. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), reprinted in v THE 
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADlSON 269, 271 (G. Hunt ed. 1904) [hereinafter cited as v ]AMES 
MADlSON]. 
9. Address by James Madison before the United States House of Representatives Gune 8, 
1789), reprinted in id. at 370, 380. 
10. I d. at 370,385. 
11. Id. at 370, 389. 
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dwell upon extraordinary notions of judicial review, but here, as elsewhere 
(e.g., The Federalist Papers12), they treat judicial review quite matter of factly. 
The marginal uncertainties of the Bill of Rights were taken for granted. The 
assumption that judges would nonetheless feel bound to apply its provisions 
as superior law is seen as no anomaly, but rather as a useful device. The 
attitudes expressed are those of reasonable optimism and not of either naivete 
or fear. 
Today, however, things are much changed. Two centuries of constitutional 
adjudication have produced a greying of the Constitution and an uneasiness 
respecting the interpretive predilections of our own Supreme Court that makes 
its imitation abroad problematic and amendment here at home discouragingly 
difficult. My own sense of the ill-fated Equal Rights Amendment,tJ for in-
stance, is that it became a casualty to the apprehensions of persons who frankly 
feared not what it said, but how it might be judicially construed. My best 
impression of efforts in England to secure an equivalent, enforceable Bill of 
Rights in that country is that the task has been made much more difficult, 
rather than more likely, because of our experience. I also think that a great 
deal of this is due to the judiciary's own excessive ingenuity and to the mis-
placed wisdom that has urged upon the Supreme Court a variety of utterly re-
markable views respecting the interpretation (and "noninterpretation") of the 
Constitution. 
12. E.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 485·86 (A. Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed. 1888): 
The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A 
constitution is in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law. It 
therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any par-
ticular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen to be an ir-
reconcilable variance between the two, that which has the superior obligation and 
validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the Constitution ought to 
be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents. 
See also materials and references in R. BERGER, CONGRESS VERSUS THE SUPREME COURT (1969) 
(while not useful as a source respecting the scope of the clause it purported to deal with, 
i.e., the clause in Article III respecting "such exceptions" as Congress may make to the Su· 
preme Court's appellate jurisdiction, is nonetheless a very full collection of materials re-
specting the widespread understanding that substantive constitutional review, incidental to 
adjudication, would be a feature of the judicial power); A. BicKEL, THE LEAsr DANGEROUS 
BRANCH 15 (1962); Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Powers of the 
Federal Courts, 1801-1835,49 U. CHI. L. REv. 646, 655-57 (1982); Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide 
to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. I, 38-45. 
13. Proposed by Congress as the twenty-seventh amendment on March 22, 1972, and the 
extended ratification deadline having expired on June 30, 1982 (three states [of the requisite 
38] short of ratification), the amendment would have provided: 
Section l. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the 
United States or by any State on account of sex. 
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article. 
Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratification. 
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From nearly the beginning, and certainly with the emergence of John 
Marshall, "special" theories of constitutional interpretation have competed for 
favor within our Supreme Court. In Marshall's case, it was the innovation of a 
constitutional jurisprudence pursuant to which acts of Congress (other than 
those affecting the judiciaryl)14 would not be subjected to the same judicial pre-
disposition as acts of the several states. Rather, acts of Congress would be 
treated as presumptively constitutional;15 and only in the event that their 
validity depended upon a manifestly unreasonable or virtually unimaginable 
interpretation of some clause, might they be successfully impugned.16 On the 
other hand, no similar loose construction attended the Marshall Court's review 
(and invalidation) of state laws in respect to those few constitutional clauses as 
were addressed to the statesP 
Still, despite his enormously impressive influence on the Supreme Court and 
his remarkable thirty-four years of service, John Marshall could not live as long 
as the Constitution itself. And predictably, the fundamentals of Marshall's 
particular special theory of constitutional interpretation would not necessarily 
be shared by the Chief Justice (Taney) or the Associate Justices who would 
come after him. As the jurisprudence of Marshall's own special theory was not 
fixed in the Constitution, nor was it by any means otherwise so persuasive that 
none could give reasons to reject it, it could not last. Thus, it came to be dis-
14. In Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), it was obvious that several 
plausible interpretations of those clauses in Article Ill describing congressional power in the 
allocation and regulation of the judicial power, were available to sustain the Act of Congress. 
See Van Alstyne, supra note 12, at 30-32. 
15. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
16. John Marshall, it may be useful to add, had no difficulty concluding that the Alien and 
Sedition Acts of 1798, the first piece of national legislation seriously abridging speech, were 
plainly constitutional. 
17. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) ("contract" impairment 
clause of Article I, § 10 interpreted to include legislative grant of land which a state was held 
to have no power to "impair" by rescinding on grounds of fraud and corruption); Dartmouth 
College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) (similarly activist interpretation of 
contracts clause to invalidate state acts). For additional examples and an excellent review, see 
generally Currie, supra note 12. The seed of the rationale for more aggressive review 
of state vis-a-vis federal laws generally (both procedural and substantive activism), keyed to 
a special theory of rationing the occasions and substance of constitutional review according to 
the representative adequacy of the legislative source, appears in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). It was given a systematic push in an unduly famous essay by 
James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 
HARv. L. REv. 129 (1893), once identified by Justice Felix Frankfurter as perhaps the single 
most important piece of writing on American constitutional law. See also A. BICKEL, supra 
note 12, at 35-40. The essential thesis similarly figures centrally in Wechsler, The Political 
Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the 
National Government, 54 CoLUM. L. REv. 543 (1954). An extreme version (literally removing 
judicial review of any exertion of national power brought into question on the ground that 
it exceeded any enumerated or implied power) is proposed in J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REviEw AND 
THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCFSS 175 (1980) ("The federal judiciary should not decide 
constitutional questions respecting the ultimate power of the national government vis-a-vis 
the states.''). 
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placed by quite a different theory- one not at all consistent with Marshall's 
views.18 
From that time to this time has, in turn, been quite a long time. Other in-
dividuals, holding other strong special theories of judicial role and of constitu-
tional interpretation, have had their own turn on the Court.19 Each, more-
over, has drawn varying measures of extraordinary encouragement from very 
able and occasionally very zealous American scholars. And some, noting the 
lack of compunction of their predecessors who presumed to proceed by very 
different theories than those who preceded them, felt correspondingly at ease in 
doing likewise. And so things have gone. 
Within the span of any one generation, the appearance and the dominance 
of some special theory need not particularly have mattered. For within a 
given period, an established judicial predisposition may well become "normal," 
i.e., it may become standard and, in some sense, thus also become correct. Even 
between two generations, each reflecting quite a different judicial predisposition 
toward constitutional interpretation, the sense of consternation need not be 
great. Insofar as the decisional consequences of one Supreme Court's interpreta-
tive orientation may well have become politically resented, a shift in the 
doctrinal vagaries of the next Court, albeit in fact a shift to yet another non-
neutral position, would not necessarily be seen as such. Rather, it might be 
(mis)understood as merely providing a welcome corrective of the perceived 
hubris or error of the immediately preceding Court. 
But it is an inevitable consequence of having an aging Constitution that it 
exhibits these practices over a very long span of time. And therein is the rub. 
Over two centuries, the precedents of previous adjudications accumulate. The 
early cases, under John Jay or John Marshall, were not disadvantaged by the 
geriatrics of accumulated precedent. Increasingly, however, as the detritis of 
past decisions mass like so many granular mounds, the piles of antecedent case 
law confront each new Justice until the task is principally to account for the 
prior case law and only incidentally, as it were, to interpret the Constitution. 
The early cases arising under the Constitution tended much more strongly to 
set down a distinctive jurisprudence. They read as one might expect constitu-
tional law to read. The holdings were cast in broad, quite confidently asserted 
terms. The opinions fastened on principal issues. The Court was infrequently 
18. For example, it is plain that Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), 
written by Chief Justice Taney, does not proceed from an interpretative predisposition at all 
like that reflected in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), in which Chief 
Justice Marshall sustained an Act of Congress vesting four-fifths majority control of a national 
bank in private shareholders and private directors, and holding that it was immune to the 
taxation power of any state despite the absence of any provision in the Bank Act which 
purported to legislate such immunity. 
19. E.g., Mr. Justice Black's textual literalism was defended instrumentally as most 
conducive to strong protection of civil rights. See Black, i'Hr. justice Black, The Supreme Court 
and the Bill of Rights, HARPER's, Feb. 1961, at 63; Reich, Mr. justice Black and the Living 
Constitution, 76 HARV. L. REv. 67:1 (1963). His jurisprudence, however, often resulted in quite 
the opposite application. See, e.g., Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969); Tinker v. Des 
Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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divided, and the resulting doctrines were strong.20 In reading early cases, what-
ever else one might think of them, one felt that they had the feel of constitu-
tional law. While there was in fact a heavy bias in the interpretive predilections 
of the Marshall Court, still it had the enormous advantage of not having to 
answer to the stare decisis legacy of two centuries of shifting schemes of pre-
dilection. Now, however, there is such an outstanding exhibition of special 
interpretive preferences respecting predispositions of constitutional review that 
it is much more awkward to maintain that it is this Constitution that is being 
interpreted. Rather, it is more widely felt that one must ask: whose partial 
jurisprudence is currently being applied? 
Among the many varieties of such partial jurisprudence, examples and very 
elaborate scholarship can be mustered to endorse quite a large number of very 
different propositions, virtually as though each were itself prescribed in Article 
III. The following is by no means an exhaustive list: 
I. Acts of Congress shall not be examined for consistency with the 
Constitution according to the same interpretive predilection as shall be 
applied to such clauses that may restrict state legislation;21 and> 
2. Acts of the national government which are challenged merely 
on the ground that the Constitution· confides the power to perform some 
act to a Department other than the Department from which it issued 
shall not be examined at all;22 moreover, 
3. No act of government arising from any source of government, 
whether national, state, or local, should be seriously examined for con-
sistency with the Constitution except to the extent that it results from a 
process which the Supreme Court believes to be insufficiently demo-
cratic;23 but 
20. See Currie, supra note 12, at 647: 
This was a time of vigorous affirmation of national authority and of vigorous enforce-
ment of constitutional limitations on the states; a time of extensive opinions in the 
grand style we have come to associate with Marshall; a time, moreover, of remarkable 
stability and official unanimity .••• The rarity of recorded dissent during this period 
was so great as to be almost incredible by modern standards. 
21. See supra note 17. 
22. See, e.g., J. CHOPER, supra note 17, at 263 {"The federal judiciary should not decide 
constitutional questions concerning the respective powers of Congress and the President vis-a-
vis one another.'). 
23. To a considerable extent, the proposition is embedded in Thayer's rule which 
obliges the Court to sustain unconstitutional acts of Congress not merely when challenged 
on grounds of insufficient enacting authority, but also when challenged on grounds that they 
interfere with affirmatively protected rights. Thayer, supra note 17, at 151. Relatedly, insofar 
as John Ely endorses a tougher substantive standard of equal protection review contingent 
upon the (judicially perceived) extent to which certain group interests are not given equal 
dignity or respect within a legislative process, necessarily the idea is equivalently that no 
similar conformity to the equal protection clause should be required insofar as (judges think) 
other group interests are given sufficient respect in legislative processes. J. Er.v, DEMOCRACY 
AND DISTRUST! A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 146-65 (1980). The general reference for this 
sort of thinking is a footnote in Justice Stone's opinion in United States v. Carolene Prods. 
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). On its face, Stone's footnote was merely a justification for 
procedural judicial activism. It suggested that judges ought to be selectively willing to take 
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4. Such laws as may be thought to be representation-reinforcing for 
neglected minorities shall in any case not be examined for consistency 
with the Constitution by the same standards as would apply to other 
legislation; 24 on the other hand, 
5. Such acts of government which, in the Supreme Court's view (as 
informed by a convincing jurisprudence of moral philosophy) abridge 
any natural right fundamental to persons, shall be examined with 
sufficient scrutiny as is most likely to determine that they are inconsistent 
with this Constitution; 25 and finally, 
such cases, and willing to take a harder look at them ("more searching judicial inquiry'') 
than other kinds of cases. It did not decide that such cases, upon examination, should 
necessarily also result in holding the law invalid unless they satisfied a more exacting sub-
stantive standard of constitutional demand. The footnote was, however, developed into an 
independent, sociological rationale for differentiated substantive standards as well. Most of 
its favored categories are hopelessly far removed from the separate historical basis that 
would reserve a unique standard for race-based Jaws alone. The conventional standard of 
equal protection review is one that virtually no Jaw can fail. See Gunther, In Search of Evolv-
ing Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a New Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. I 
(1972). For a few of the many lucubrations on Carotene Products' footnote, see J. ELY, supra, 
at 75-77; Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 CoLUM. L. REv. 1093 
(1982); Powell, Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1087 (1982). 
24. See, e.g., J. ELY, supra note 23, at 222. See also Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse 
Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Cm. L. REv. 723 (1974); Ely, Democracy and judicial Review, 
17 STAN. LAW. 3 (1982). 
25. Critically reviewed in Grano, judicial Review and a Written Constitution in a Demo-
cratic Society, 28 WAYNE L. REv. 1 (1981), and in Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 359 (1981). For leading examples, see A. MILLER, TOWARD INCREASED JUDICIAL 
AcriVIS~I (1982); P. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 94-97, 137, 144-45, 159-67 (1982) (arguing 
for the appropriateness of "ethical" argument which, to the extent that it is distinguishable 
from a liberal interpretation of particular clauses [e.g., the ninth amendment, the privileges 
and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment], proceeds essentially by posing broad 
normative statements, eliciting audience concurrence that surely legislation inconsistent with 
such statements simply must be unconstitutional, and concluding, therefore, according to the 
ethos of the American polity, such legislation is indeed unconstitutional); Parker, The Past of 
Constitutional Theory -And Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223 (1981) (condemning the political 
pluralism characteristic of process-oriented theory and advocating exposure of underlying as-
sumptions made by the theory to strive toward more democratic approach); Perry, Non-
interpretive Review in Human Rights Cases: A Functional justification, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 
278 (1981) (reprinted in M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE CoURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 91, 
97-102, 123 (1982)) (arguing for a "religious" function for the Supreme Court, i.e., an obliga-
tion to discover contemporary vital values as the ligaments that bind an enlightened society, 
to enact them as appropriately protected rights); Richards, Human Rights as the Unwritten 
Constitution: The Problem of Change and Stability in Constitutional Interpretation, 4 U. 
DAYTON L. REv. 295 (1979) (claiming a shift to human rights in constitutional development as 
the underlying normative backdrop balancing stability and change in constitutional develop-
ment); Saphire, Professor Richards' Unwritten Constitution of Human Rights: Some Pre-
liminary Observations, 4 U. DAYTON L. REv. 305 (1979) (criticizing validity of Richards' 
theory as failing to develop role of history in human rights paradigm); Saphire, The Search 
for Legitimacy in Constitutional Theory: What Price Purity?, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 335 (1981) (ex-
ploring theories focusing on the process of decision-making and arguing that such theories 
sacrifice constitutional moral function in serving society by subordinating concern for sub-
stantively "just" decisions). For related ideas, see C. BLACK, DECISION AccoRDING TO LAw (1981); 
Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term- Foreword: The Forms of justice, 93 HARv. L. REv. I 
(1979); Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703 (1975) [hereinafter 
cited as Grey I]; Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American 
1983] DUNWODY DISTINGUISHED LECTURE IN LAW 
6. This Constitution shall be deemed to have enacted all essential 
principles of justice, despite first impressions to the contrary. Accord-
ingly, the Supreme Court shall hold invalid such legislation as con-
vincing sources of moral philosophy persuade a majority of its members 
are inconsistent with essential principles of justice, as shall they also 
employ the judicial power to impose upon all levels of government ap-
propriate enforceable obligations to insure to each person the material 
conditions of justice.2a 
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Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REv. 843 (1978); Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional 
Values, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 703 (1980). 
26. See supra sources cited note 25. See also Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Wel-
fare Rights: One View of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 962 (1973); Michelman, 
The Supreme Court, 1968 Term- Forward: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 83 HAR.v. L. REv. 7 (1969); Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional 
Democracy, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 659; Stone, Equal Protection and the Search for Justice, 22 
Aruz. L. REv. 1 (1980); Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and 
Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HAR.v. L. REv. 1065 (1977). 
27. The term "noninterpretivism" may not go back beyond its appearance in Grey I, 
supra note 25, at 703. The reason may be obvious. It signals a frank resolve to detach judicial 
review from the Constitution itself by stipulating it purports not to be interpreting the 
Constitution. It may say too much about the current condition of constitutional scholarship 
that "noninterpretivism" is willingly adopted as a mode of describing one's own work in 
constitutional law. If there were not writers who evidently welcome its fit, e.g., Perry, supra 
note 25, at 278, one might have supposed that its use was limited and purely perjorative, a 
mere epithet cast cruelly against a judge or another writer-a harsh opinion of their work 
(e.g., that judge so-and-so rendered another "noninterpretation" of the first amendment in his 
latest opinion). Compare the following comment by James White on these tendencies: 
To say, as some do, that "we" ought to regard ourselves as "free" from the constraints 
of meaning and authority, free to make "our" Constitution what "we" want it to be, 
is in fact to propose the destruction of an existing community, established by our laws 
and Constitution, extending from "we" who are alive to those who have given us the 
materials of our cultural world, and to substitute for it another, the identity of which is 
most uncertain indeed. In place of the constituted "we" that it is the achievement of our 
past to have given us, we are offered an unconstituted "we," or a "we" constituted on 
the pages of law journals. One can properly ask of such a person, and mean it literally, 
"Who are you to speak as you do? Who is the 'we' of whom you speak?" To answer that 
the new "we" is defined not by the Constitution we have, but by the Constitution we 
wish we had, is no answer at all; for who is the "we" doing the wishing? In the new 
world, who shall be king? 
White, Law as Language: Reading Law and Reading Literature, 60 TEX. L. REv. 415, 442-43 
(1982) (footnote omitted). 
Volunteers are evidently not in short supply. Having persuaded himself that "noninter-
pretivism" is inevitable in any case (see Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique 
of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HAR.v. L. REv. 183 (1982)), Mark Tushnet pre-
sumes to respond to the unasked question: 
\\Then I reach this point in the argument ••• I am invariably asked, "Well, ••• 
how would you decide the X case?" 
My answ·er, in brief, is to make an explicitly political judgment; which result is, in the 
circumstances, likely to advance the cause of socialism? Having decided that, I would 
write an opinion in some currently favored version of Grand Theory. 
Tushnet, The Dilemmas of Liberal Constitutionalism, 42 Omo ST. L.J. 411, 424 (1981). 
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Of course, not all of these prescriptive interpretative and noninterpretative27 
directives could be provided. for in Article III, even were there a predisposition 
to do so, for they fit together uncomfortably. It is true, moreover, that in fact 
none of them is thus provided for, 28 although each has been enthusiastically 
endorsed and each, to some extent, has been acted upon to some extent by the 
Supreme Court at different times. 
There is, however, a cost to these things. The American model is difficult 
to commend abroad when its career at home exhibits such a high degree of 
unanticipated judicial plasticity. It has become increasingly difficult to alter, 
moreover, when the anxiety of even marginal ambiguity in proposed amend-
ments cannot now be answered as Madison was able to answer Hamilton's 
concerns. We do not dare now to add the possibility of new troubles given 
the troubles we have seen. Time may not always heal all things. In the aging 
of our Constitution, time has tended to reveal too many things. 
There may be, moreover, the additional misfortune of a negative synergism 
at work in these matters - a long term effect that neither the Supreme Court nor 
a majority of people would desire if either could control the matter solely by 
their own action, but an effect nonetheless that tends to come from their joint 
reactions. The Constitution is increasingly difficult to modify by amendment. 
The difficulty is partly the consequence of mistrust of uncertainty, a mistrust 
to which the judiciary has itself contributed by its endless, shifting quest 
among special theories of constitutional review. The sheer greater unamend-
ability of the Constitution in turn, however, reciprocally presses in on the 
judiciary- that it must do its best to spin out additional, mutating "mean-
ings" from existing clauses to maintain the contemporaneity of the (now un-
alterable) Constitution. If, for instance, it is no longer feasible for an Equal 
Rights Amendment to be ratified, it becomes even more legitimate than be-
fore for the Supreme Court to construe the fourteenth amendment toward the 
same end. And yet, since the judiciary tends to take this task upon itself any-
way,29 what then does it matter that the Equal Rights Amendment was not 
ratified, and who, moreover, could be confident of its interpretation were it to 
be approved? 
II 
It is sometimes observed quite ruefully that were the first amendment or 
the entire Bill of Rights to be freshly considered today, as though they were 
28. Nor is there the slightest reason to think that any of these formulations would be 
acceptable as a proposed, express provision for inclusion explicitly in Article III. 
29. E.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (Brennan, J., for a plurality). 
See also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). Compare Van Alstyne, The Proposed Twenty-
Seventh Amendment: A Brief, Supportive Comment, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 189 with Note, 
Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection: Do We Need a Constitutional Amendment?, 84 
HARV. L. REv. 1499 (1971). Others, unimpressed with the straining required to adapt the 
fourteenth amendment to render superfluous any new amendment, nonetheless urge essentially 
the same outcome via some other existing provision (e.g., the ninth amendment). Compare 
C. BLACK, supra note 25, at 35 with Van Alstyne, Slouching Toward Bethlehem with the 
Ninth Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 207 (1981). 
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not now a feature of our Constitution, they could not possibly be accepted. 
Most often, the point is offered reproachfully to suggest that Americans do 
not believe in these liberties as much as was originally the case. Possibly there 
is something to that idea, but possibly it is much oversold. Rather, it may be 
that we have been tutored to take proposed constitutional language much more 
seriously, to parse each phrase, to imagine every possible nuance of each ad-
jective or noun, and to treat the matter much more as we would treat the fine 
print in the exclusionary clauses of an insurance policy, i.e., with fear and ap-
prehension, rather than ·with hope and confidence. Very little in the Bill of 
Rights itself could endure that process and, with all respect, the tendency of 
the Court to superimpose special, or noninterpretive predispositions is certainly 
part of the difficulty. 
To be sure, given a certain view of judges, and given a certain capacity for 
philosophic detachment, it may be feasible to dismiss these difficulties as in-
consequential. If one imagines that enlightened judges can stay atop matters, 
one may also suppose that their own ingenuity may be sufficient to "perfect" 
the Constitution, however spare its actual provisions. Surely, this view is not 
merely remarkably optimistic, however, but considerably silly. A wholly creative 
Supreme Court could well have made an isolated provision in Article IV of 
the Constitution (that the United States shall guarantee to each state a "re-
publican" form of government) an ample text to have outlawed slavery, to 
have extended the right to vote, and to have protected free speech as well. For 
is it not obvious that no government can be genuinely republican (i.e., repre-
sentative) unless it is a government of free people, sharing a common right to 
vote, and fully protected in their freedom to express their political differences? 
Thus the bare text of this one clause in Article IV can facilitate immense 
good. A special theory of a constitutional role for courts would endorse it. 
Accordingly, neither the first,30 thirteenth,31 fourteenth,32 fifteenth,aa nine-
teenth,34 twenty-fourth,35 nor twenty-sixth amendment,36 was important after 
all. None needs to have "cluttered" the Constitution. Given suitable ingenuity, 
perhaps the whole of the Constitution could be reduced to a single paragraph 
and still not lose any of the judicial glossing it has received. 
At the other extreme, there is the view that the judiciary ought never invoke 
the Constitution as an invalidating barrier to legislation unless no amount of 
ingenuity can plausibly free them from doing so, because judicial review is 
30. "Congress shall make no law ••• abridging the freedom of speech or of the press •••• " 
U.S. CoNST. amend. I. 
31. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude . • • shall exist within the United 
States •.•• " ld. amend. XIII, § 1. 
32. '"[N]or shall any state ••• deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws." Id. amend. XIV, § 1. 
33. "The right •.. to vote shall not be denied or abridged ••• on account of race, color, 
or previous condition of servitude." I d. amend. XV, § 1. 
34. "The right •.. to vote shall not be denied ••• on account of sex.'' I d. amend. XIV, § 1. 
35. "The right •.• to vote ... shall not be denied .•• by reason of failure to pay any 
poll tax or other tax.'' Id. amend XXVI, § 1. 
36. "The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, 
to vote shall not be denied ••. on account of age.'' Id., amend. XXVI, § 1. 
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itself anti-democratic and to that extent objectionable_37 A recently popular 
37. See Thayer, supra note 17, at 151. I characterized as "unduly famous" this original 
and most influential article, in note 17. Perhaps I should say why. 
With respect to the adjudication of cases involving challenges to the constitutionality of 
states statutes, Thayer held that it was the duty of the judiciary "to allow to [the] constitution 
nothing less than its just and true interpretation." Id. at 155. In fully equivalent cases in-
volving acts of Congress, however, it was Thayer's view that the Court was emphatically not 
to allow the Constitution anything less than "its just and true interpretation;" rather, it was 
to allow much less than a just and true interpretation. The Court was urged to do so, more-
over, whether the issue of constitutionality turned on an alleged failure of enumerated or 
implied constitutional power vested in Congress to presume to do as it had done, or whether 
the issue turned on the inconsistency of the Act with some positive prohibition in the Bill 
of Rights. Thus, Thayer acknowledged that his proposed rule will operate against "private 
rights" as well, though it has a "tendency to drive out questions of justice and right - .•. " 
Id. In brief, acts of Congress were to be upheld and enforced by the Supreme Court unless 
founded on a preposterous, rather than an erroneous, misinterpretation of the Constitution. 
Moreover, even if the legislative record were to make it quite clear that Congress had in fact 
never even considered the constitutionality of its proposed action, Thayer urged the vil!lv 
that the Court should nonetheless pretend that it had, pretend also that Congress treated 
the issue (of constitutional interpretation) conscientiously, and pretend that Congress would 
not have enacted the Bill but for a good faith belief in its consistency with the Constitution. 
Indeed, even if the congressional record made it quite clear that Congress enacted the Bill 
despite its own expressed doubts and in express expectation that the issue would be more 
appropriately resolved in court, still the Supreme Court was to treat the Bill as (falsely) re-
flecting a conscientious debate in Congress and a conscientious conclusion that the Bill was not 
inconsistent with the Constitution. See id. at 146 (dealing with the problem and airily con-
cluding that "we must assume that the legislature have done their duty .... "). 
Taken at face value, Thayer's "analysis" should produce Supreme Court rulings along 
any of the following lines. None of them seems the least bit attractive: 
1. The Act as applied in this case does not in our view rest within any enumerated 
or implied power of Congress; moreover, despite the able argument by counsel represent-
ing the government whose views we have heard respectfully, we are persuaded that as 
applied, this Act also abridges the petitioner's freedom of speech contrary to the first 
amendment. However, as our view is not controlling, as Congress is irrebutably pre-
sumed to have concluded othenvise, and as its view though incorrect is merely in-
correct and no worse, we now sustain the Act as applied; [or] 
2. We hold that the Act of Congress as applied is not unconstitutional either for 
lack of power to enact it or for conflict with some affirmative prohibition in the 
Constitution (although, of course, this in fact is not our view); [or] 
3. ·we hold that the argument respecting the unconstitutionality of the Act of 
Congress is correct and has not been refuted, but since reasonable persons might 
conclude otherwise we therefore hold the Act to be constitutional. 
I think none of this would have been the least bit attractive but for the character of 
practical results that the thesis was expected to yield; namely, that acts of Congress which a 
conservative Court would hold invalid might, under Thayer's rule, be sustained. Of course, 
that kind of outcome more favorable to Congress might well be desirable and defensible by 
rules of constitutional interpretation eminently persuasive in their own right, yet (unlike 
Thayer's rule) not in the least derogating from the independence of judicial constitutional 
review. It requires no fictitious imputation of constitutional interpretation within Congress 
(and no nonsense suppositions about either the representativeness or scruples of Congress) for 
the judiciary itself to apply a rule of generous construction in respect to the enumerated 
powers of Congress. The rule of generous construction, like Thayer's rule of "clear error," may 
of course result in upholding more acts of Congress than otherwise might be sustained_ While 
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variant of this argument is that the Supreme Court should yield the "mean-
ing" of the Constitution in such degree as the legislation under review appears 
to be the product of democratic processes. One might reject the assumptions 
of either argument merely on the practical basis that the Court (as well as the 
Constitution) is on quicksand once it feels charmed by this advice. A majority 
of people constituting a representative body at one time may be no less 
genuinely representative at that time than a fully equivalent majority of an-
other time, but with each holding a wholly different view of the power they 
possess under the Constitution. Depending, then, upon the accident of the 
substance of the enacted legislation, indistinguishable statutes (indistinguish-
able, that is, in terms of the degree of representativeness that secures them) 
are identically "constitutional" though their provisions in fact may be mutually 
exclusive of one another and mutually exclusive also in terms of their com-
patibility with the Constitution. In this fashion, judges have little to do other 
than to be jerked about as mannikins, approving the "constitutionality" of 
whatever is "representatively" enacted, and reviewing seriously only "un-
representative" enactments. 
Additionally, the proposition that the Supreme Court should vary the 
substance of constitutional clauses depending upon its view of the "representa-
tiveness" of the particular legislation at issue in the case, is subject to the 
serious objection that it imputes to the Court an obligation it has no profes-
sional competence to discharge. Its "judgments" in this area are unlikely to be 
sophisticated, 38 its outcomes will be correspondingly eccentric, and its reason-
ing tends ultimately to exhibit a built-in circularity. 
Sometimes, the object of "representativeness" inquiry is -the electoral 
representativeness of the office holder or law-making body whos_e act or practice 
is in constitutional question.39 The notion is that the wider the electoral 
not free from criticism on its own account (federalism critics will tend to fault it), it is not 
contingent upon doubtful assumptions respecting the capacity of the President or the 
Congress fairly to assess the scope of their respective powers for the purpose of binding courts 
as well. Neither does it make any assumptions (irrebuttable or otherwise) that the President 
or Congress actually made such an inquiry before acting, or acted only after conscientious 
anguishing. Certainly it does not invite a tendency to ration the independence of judicial re-
view inversely to the degree of consideration that those departments may have given the 
matter. In brief, there is no renunciation of independent judicial review, and no subordination 
of the Court's own view of the "just and true" interpretation of the Constitution according 
to the politically-driven and self-serving rhetoric of the political departments. 
38. An example is readily furnished by Justice Brennan's opinion in Regents of the 
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 361 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting), in 
which the analysis based on representativeness jurisprudence is either clearly unsophisticated 
or seriously disingenuous. Compare the opinion in the same case by Justice Powell. Id. at 265. 
See also Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. 
Cm. L. REv. 775, 800-02 (1979). 
39. For a discussion and interesting case review applying this point of view, see C. BLACK, 
STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 76-95 (1969). According to this view, 
the degree of "presumption of constitutional validity" will move from zero in the case of an 
individual police officer's on-the-spot decision to take certain action (which is subsequently 
challenged) through "1" when the officer acted pursuant to a (mere) local ordinance adopted 
by a city council through "3" when anchored in ll 4early-framed state law, through "8" wheri 
in the form of a clear Act of Congress, 
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auspices of the source of "law" drawn into question, the greater the demonstra-
tion must be of its degree of inconsistency with the clause or combination of 
clauses pursuant to which it is challenged.40 
Sometimes, the object of "representativeness" will instead focus on the 
breadth of the electoral base composed by the enacting body to suggest the 
substantive validity of an act subsequently challenged in an appropriate case 
on grounds of alleged substantive constitutional inconsistency. If, however, the 
ambient legislative circumstances suggest to the Court that the majority of 
legislators, and those whom they represent, may be indifferent to the proposed 
Act (for instance, the Act would have no immediate implications for them 
[except, of course, as a legislative precedent]), then the datum that the Act 
will not in fact have a broad field of application is deemed to undermine the 
integrity of its "representative" auspices such that a lesser degree of constitu-
tional inconsistency should suffice to have the Court hold that it is unconstitu-
tional.41 
A variation of this second approach then closes the gap by becoming 
circular. If, though an Act emerges under electorally-representative auspices 
(e.g., Congress rather than an individual police officer), and though it will 
affect a majority of all persons in all regions of the country alike, to the 
extent that members of the Court surmise from the content of the Act that it 
cannot be authentically representative (because to the Court's satisfaction such 
an Act could not have been passed if it were "authentically" representative), 
then it is stripped of any presumption of substantive constitutional consistency 
and, indeed, is presumed not to satisfy the clause invoked to question it.42 
40. Note, then, that what would be "held" unconstitutional when reflected merely in the 
practice of a given police officer may (and sometimes must) logically be "held" constitutional 
if reflected in a state statute. Of course, that inconsistency could be avoided by treating the 
first decision on the merits as a binding precedent (though by hypothesis the "first decision" 
itself would have been different had that "first decision" involved a state statute [or federal 
statute] rather than an individual police officer's act) -but this way of coping with incon-
sistency then makes the content of the prevailing constitutional rule very much the accident 
of which kind of "case" happened to be adjudicated first. How very strange. One may at-
tempt other permutations, but most will be found to exhibit similar difficulties. The point 
illustrated here is distinct from the different point discussed in note 43, infra, in the example 
taken from South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). Rather, it is a more general 
form of the example (infra note 42) taken from Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
41. But see Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), yielding to Congress the determina-
tion of what kinds of state legislative distinctions are forbidden by the equal protection 
clause, though the provisions of the Act in question affected a very limited portion of the 
nation and in fact received virtually no attention in Congress. A refinement to this approach 
would qualify it, however, by reinstating the nearly insurmountable presumption of substan-
tive constitutional consistency insofar as the Court is of the view that, despite the regional or 
othenvise restricted field of impact of the proposed Act, the economic and;or sociological 
position of those to whom it may apply is such that their political influence with the legisla-
ture is "bound" to be substantial. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 7Il, 767 n.2 
(1945); South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 185 n.2 (1938). 
42. Legislation unfavorable to women is treated generally in this respect, partly on the 
conjecture that women are (sometimes) not adequate to represent their interests because of self-
victimization of "stereotype," e.g., that they would have effectively acted to forestall certain 
legislation, but for the damaging effects of our culture which precludes them from taking 
their own constitutional rights seriously within the legislative process, and obliging the 
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The circle is closed by generalizing this last analysis: such legislation as 
certain Justices believe to be "unjust" can never be representative since by 
definition authentically representative bodies could not have enacted it had 
they been duly considerate of what they were doing (i.e., duly representative):ts 
Thus, every "unjust" law carries no presumption of representativeness and 
Court to do so in their behalf. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 n.17 (1973). 
Compare discussion in J. ELY, supra note 23, at 166-69 with Note, supra note 29, at 1505 n.48. 
Legislation favorable to women may likewise be treated the same way, insofar as the same 
school of political sociology can persuade some Justices that such legislation, unfavorable to 
men, is only seemingly unfavorable to men (but actually favorable to them [in the Court's 
view] insofar as it is favorable to women in respect to some reinforcement of "woman's role"). 
See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. of Women v. Hogan, 102 S. Ct. 3331, 3339 (and compare the dissent 
at 3347) (1982); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 220 n.2 
(1976). 
43. This use of representativeness jurisprudence in the rationing of substantive judicial 
activism should also be distinguished from the relevance of legislative facts in constitutional 
litigation. See, e.g., Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 SuP. CT. REv. 
75. The distinction is illustrated by comparing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), 
with South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). In the first case, Morgan, an Act of 
Congress forbade the use of voter-literacy tests because in its view the use of such tests was 
per se sufficiently unfair as to deny equal protection to such persons as could not pass them. 
In the second case, South Carolina, an Act of Congress suspended the use of voter-literacy 
tests in certain jurisdictions as an efficient means of enforcing the fifteenth amendment's pro-
hibition against otherwise-difficult-to-detect racial misapplications of such tests by voting 
registrars. 
In South Carolina, no novel or different construction of the fifteenth amendment was 
relied upon by Congress than the judiciary, acting independently, regarded as entirely sound 
(and conventional). The question, then, was the sufficiency of the factual predicate relied upon 
by Congress, the sufficiency of the "legislative facts:" i.e., was there sufficient evidence of 
difficult-to-detect registrar misapplications of certain literacy tests to support Congress' con-
clusion that, given these conditions, the remedy it proposed (suspending the tests in jurisdic-
tions in which less than half of the eligible-age population registered and voted in 1964, miti-
gated by a bail out provision), was legislation "appropriate" to enforce the fifteenth amend-
ment's prohibition of such racial misapplications? The Court agreed that the evidence was 
sufficient. 
In Morgan, Congress presumed to legislate its view respecting the constitutional con-
sistency of literacy tests and the obligation of each state to deny to no person the equal pro-
tection of its laws. The Court had previously held that there was no inconsistency between 
minimal English literacy test requirements and the equal protection restriction on the 
several states. A majority of the court nonetheless concluded that insofar as it could "perceive 
a basis" for the contrary (legal) conclusion reached by Congress, it would yield to the reason-
ableness of that view. But see Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). 
The implications of the Morgan case can, of course, be confined. See, e.g., Choper, Con-
gressional Power to Expand Judicial Definitions of the Substantive Terms of the Civil War 
Amendments, 67 MINN. L. REv. 299 (1982); Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due 
Process and Equal Protection?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 603 (1975). Nonetheless, Morgan does provide 
a strong opening wedge for additional "representativeness" determinations as, say, that the 
Court should similarly yield if it could "perceive a basis" for a (legal) conclusion reached by 
Congress that two-month old fetuses are as deserving of protection as seven-month old fetuses 
such that it shall be a federal crime for physicians whose medical practice may affect such 
commerce as it is within the congressional power to regulate, or physicians either directly or 
indirectly receiving federal funds, to perform an abortion resulting in death or damage to a 
fetus more mature than sixty (thirty? ten?) days old. Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
{1973). 
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correspondingly, no presumption of substantive constitutional consistency 
attaches such that the Court should defer in the absence of litigation demon-
strating a "clear error" (rather than a mere error) in the constitutional premises 
of the enacting body. 
The denouement of "representativeness" jurisprudence may ultimately 
follow this form: 
I. "Truly representative" legislation is not to be held inconsistent with 
the Constitution merely because the Court is (otherwise) persuaded that it is 
unauthorized or forbidden by the Constitution. Rather, such legislation must 
be sustained unless premised upon a manifestly unreasonable interpretation of 
that clause or combination of clauses that has been brought to bear on the 
question; 
2. "Unjust" legislation, however, is never "truly representative," because 
legislation which is in fact "unjust" could not have been duly considerate (i.e., 
truly representative) in respect to those whom it affects; 
3. Therefore, all legislation which (the Court thinks) is "unjust," is 
stripped of any presumption of substantive constitutional consistency; indeed, 
such legislation must be held invalid once shown to be inconsistent with what 
is itself not a manifestly fanciful interpretation of that clause or combination 
of clauses that has been brought to bear on the question. 
-The simpler form is this: 
I. Laws a current majority of this Court think are "just" shall (almost) 
always be held to be constitutional, the Constitution to the contrary notwith-
standing; 
2. Laws a current majority of this Court think are "unjust" shall (almost) 
always be held to be unconstitutional, the Constitution to the contrary not-
withstanding. 44 
To foreign students of American constitutional government, the basic 
objection itself must sound extremely peculiar. The international significance 
of American constitutional law is precisely that the institution of judicial re-
view is anti-democratic. To "reveal" that it is anti-democratic may sound as 
though a shameful discovery had been made deserving of apology and atone-
ment. In fact it is no revelation at all. It is seized upon with the same indicting 
passion as though one were to read the Constitution for the first time and dis-
cover that several of its original clauses actually condoned slavery which, until 
the investment of the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments, was entirely 
true.45 Still, as in the case of the several slave clauses, the anticipated anti-
44. These uses of "representativeness" jurisprudence in adjusting the substantive standards 
of various clauses, incidentally, should be distinguished from their uses in respect to procedural 
(as distinct from substantive) judicial restraint and judicial activism. The 4,000 plus caseload 
of the Supreme Court (the majority of which cases are on its certiorari, rather than its appeal 
docket) obviously requires some rationing system in determining which cases to hear. The 
tendency of judges to employ their own notions of political sociology in deciding which cases 
to hear (e.g., because certain types of laws seem "fishy") may not be very sophisticated and 
may, of course, engender its own frustrations. But it produces no important body of sub-
stantive constitutional law with the ramified inconsistencies and the sheet vagrancy of keying 
the "meaning" of clauses to percdved "representativeness." 
45. See U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (direct taxes shall be apportioned •.• by adding to 
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democratic character of judicial review was no secret. Rather, it was treated 
most matter-of-factly. And, unlike the slave clauses in this respect, it was not 
defended merely as a necessary concession to secure ratification. It was de-
fended as a positive good: the integrity of the Constitution would not depend 
upon mutating impressions in Congress or elsewhere.46 Judges were not ex-
pected to "adjust" the meaning of clauses in proportion to the numbers or 
representativeness of legislative bodies. The difficulty with the objection is, 
therefore, that while its endless repetition has given it the appearance of pro-
found insight, it may rather be set aside as altogether trivial. 
m 
Virtually discarded among the many descriptions of constitutional review 
in the United States, in contrast with the many special theories, is the follow-
ing description by the unremarkable Justice Owen Roberts: 
When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the courts as 
not conforming to the constitutional mandate, the judicial branch of 
the Government has only one duty- to lay the article of the Constitu-
tion which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide 
whether the latter squares with the former.47 
As a concise summary of the judicial obligation, Justice Roberts' dictum is 
worthy of consideration despite the sophisticated criticism it obviously invites. 
To be sure, its comparison of the judicial task with a mere mechanical exercise 
may be subject to criticism;48 the thought that the judicial task is as simply 
done as laying down a T-square to see whether one line is perpendicular to an-
other may itself not square even with an ordinary citizen's impression of the 
diffic:;ulty, to say nothing of those professionally involved in constitutional 
litigation. But the suggestion that the judicial task of constitutional review 
should be performed with the same undissembling interest in accuracy as one 
would bring to his or her own work bench is, nonetheless, a proposal of 
enormous and lasting appeal. In fact, it may capture more accurately than any 
other single statement exactly what most people would hope for from the 
Supreme Court. 
The idea is indeed to see whether the two things, tlie statute and the 
Constitution, square. If they do not, then the judicial task, which is to state the 
truth, is not less well done on that account. The correction of the line represent-
ing a statute that does not square is for those responsible for drawing such 
lines. It is with Congress, not the Court. Similarly, the correction of the line 
representing the relevant article in the Constitution is for those to whom the 
the whole number of free Persons ••• .'') (encourages slavery because congressional representa-
tion directly correlates to the number of slaves brought into the state); id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 
C'fugitive slave" clause recognizing and enforcing slaveowners' rights). See also id. art. I, § 19, 
cl. 1; id. art. V. See generally THE CONSTITUTION, A PRo-SLAVERY COMPACT (W. Phillips ed. 
1845). 
46. See .supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
4~. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 6, 62 (1936). 
48. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, .supra note 12, at 90. 
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responsibility is given for altering such lines. It is not the Court's business to 
move it or to misrepresent its location from any presupposition of its own that 
a different constitutional line might be better. The fact that the alteration of 
constitutional lines (i.e., the amendment of constitutional clauses) is difficult, 
has no bearing on the judicial obligation. If the means of altering constitutional 
lines is thought to be too dillicult to tolerate correct decisions, that observation 
may propose a very good reason to alter the clause in the Constitution that 
makes amendment so difficult. It proposes no obvious reason, however, for 
judges to misstate the Constitution. The case to do so is no better than its 
opposite, i.e., than justifications for a predisposition to find that a statute and 
the Constitution do not square (when in fact the Court believes they do) be-
cause of antipathy to the statute or because of one's belief that Congress has 
made an enormous political or moral (but not unconstitutional) mistake. 
The Roberts dictum is sometimes brushed aside on the strength of the 
~uggestion that he did not fully appreciate that it is a Constitution the judges 
are expounding in those cases,49 and not merely some lesser thing as a statute, 
an administrative regulation, or a trivial municipal ordinance. But this 
suggestion is not at all convincing either biographically or in the abstract. 
Explicit in the dictum is the recognition that it is a Constitution being ex-
pounded. Explicit as well, however, is important recognition that it is merely 
this Constitution the judges are expounding, not some other. 
If the Constitution contains clauses not always the most noble (as of course 
it may), clauses that may weigh too heavily upon a judge's conscience, he or she 
may reassess the personal acceptability of the judicial task. If the task of this 
Constitution's scrupulous construction and application sometimes seems trivial, 
demeaning or even pernicious, the private conviction provides a thoroughly 
decent reason to find a career in something one believes to be less compromis-
ing and more ennobling. Short of entangling considerations that may sustain 
acts of civil disobedience, 5° it provides no reason to refabricate the Constitution 
or to misrepresent the statute. That it is a Constitution being expounded 
readily explains why one should be especially conscientious about its deter-
mination; it warrants an exceptional willingness to listen, to consider, and to 
be very careful.51 That because it is a Constitution being expounded judges 
49. The phrase is Marshall's, from McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406-
07 (1819), in which the immediate point is that while the government "can exercise only the 
powers granted to it," because "it is a constitution we are expounding," the "fair and just 
interpretation" of those powers ought not be grudging. The same useful proposition is 
asserted quite forcefully in a memorable Holmes' opinion a century later, as well. See Missouri 
v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). The rule of generous construction of express national powers 
is analytically quite different from a suggestion that an interpretation which the Court would 
conclude was erroneous (though "merely" erroneous and not preposterously so) should none-
theless be applied for adjudicative purposes by the judiciary if the erroneous interpretation 
is preferred by Congress. Compare supra note 37. 
50. See J. ELY, supra note 2~1. at 183 ("At that point you'd hardly be acting like a 
judge .... "). In which case one does not pretend to do one's duty, but rather declares why 
one will not do so under the circumstances. 
51. "[P]recisely because 'it is a constitution we are expounding,' we ought not to take 
liberties with it." National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 647 (1949) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
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should therefore feel more free than otherwise to fudge its interpretation, how-
ever, is a proposition that though argued often, has never been argued con-
vincingly. 
IV 
Despite the straightfonvardness of the judicial duty described by Justice 
Roberts, headway against it has also been directed from quite a different 
quarter than from those suggesting the Supreme Court should simply "adjust" 
the Constitution to make it better. The Roberts metaphor, as already noted, 
does imagine something like a T-square that judges simply lay down to see 
whether a statute squares with the Constitution. If not that, at least it must 
assume that "the line" representing the constitutional clause with which a 
statute is being compared is reasonably obvious. (It may also imagine that that 
line is not merely discernible, but that it is also fixed, i.e., that it does not 
move from time to time, though the latter assumption is not critical to all argu-
ments of this type.) In either case, "the line" representing the constitutional 
clause must at least be reasonably discernible. Otherwise, whether with the aid 
of a T-square or merely by one's own, unaided eyesight, it is impossible to 
perform the judicial duty- to say whether the statute "squares" with that line. 
In any event, this much is fairly certain: the less discernible the constitutional 
line, the less possible the performance of the judicial task even as laid down in 
the Roberts dictum. 
The headway this sort of observation seeks to make against the conventional 
description of the judicial task now becomes clear. Determining where the 
line represented by a constitutional clause lies is in fact not the same as the 
mechanical task of seeing whether one line "squares" with another. The 
Roberts dictum takes for granted the obviousness of the line representing the 
constitutional clause that has been invoked.52 The task it assumes is solely that 
of measurement, i.e., the determination of whether the two "square." But the 
problem of judges is not principally that of measurement. It is rather, that of 
interpretation. It is the problem of first deciding where does the constitutional 
line lie? Redundantly, then, the task of judges involves judgment. The Court 
must determine the meaning of words which in one moment seem plain to 
one, plain but the opposite to another, marginally uncertain to others, and 
virtually hopeless to still others. 
Between these two critical sentiments, justifications for a great deal of 
"meta" constitutional law have been proposed. For some, the Constitution is 
only too clear in certain particulars, but the clarity it yields is extremely dis-
appointing. The actual Constitution does not fulfill one's expectations; it does 
not exalt what one hopes and it is not a Constitution commensurate with one's 
notion of a Constitution as ideal norm. "The" judicial duty is therefore to ad-
just the Constitution by degree, to be guided by a meta Constitution super-
imposed upon the inadequate original, to bring it 'round to normative ma-
turity.53 
52. A. BicKEL, supra note 12, at 90. 
53. See supra materials collected notes 25-26. 
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For others, it is quite the opposite point that the Constitution is in-
sufficiently clear in nearly all of its most significant clauses, specifically its most 
normative clauses such as the due process clause, the equal protection clause, 
or the ninth amendment virtually in its entirety.54 Accordingly, "the" judicial 
duty is to impute some meaning without which the constitutionality of statutes 
cannot be determined, and to impute that meaning according to some notion 
of what courts might do that neither duplicates legislative processes nor leaves 
these clauses virtually useless in litigation.55 
The consequences of these polar objections to the conventional view of the 
judicial duty (namely, the objections that the Constitution is clear but inade-
quate and also that in its most essential features it is unclear and thus requires 
improvisation) nurtures what is, perhaps, the majority of all academic writing 
about the Constitution today. I confess, however, that I find very little of it 
helpful and cannot make any productive use of either point of view. To the 
contrary, I believe that most of it will eventually be seen at a later date as but 
the academic residue of yet another period in which American constitutional 
law records its native propensity for instability and rank politicization. 
The first view (that insofar as the Constitution is clear but disappointing, 
the appropriate role of judges is to make it "better" by reconstruction) is not 
worth further comment. The second view, that in its most interesting features 
the Constitution is just so indefinite that the Roberts dictum is simply not help-
ful (because, while the preference for a truthful construction of the Constitu-
tion is unquestionably alluring, alas it is frankly also sometimes impossible), is 
not so lightly dismissed. Indeed, in part my own professional writings are but 
an exhibit of the difficulty. Some of that writing deals with the speech and 
press clause of the first amendment- an amendment to the Constitution un-
questionably important and, on its face, of exceptional clarity. Yet, it is one 
point of an attempt to take the first amendment seriously to induce a wholly 
sympathetic understanding that conscientious interpretations of the first amend-
ment do differ: that many of the problems of constitutional adjudication are 
not imagined, that they are not contrived, and that they do not proceed merely 
from judges who are ideologues. Ideologues and persons with hubris have un-
questionably served on the United States Supreme Court. But discount every 
decision one wishes to make on that basis, and decisions of exquisite difficulty 
still remain in substantial number. The example of the free speech clause, 
seemingly the clearest provision we have in the entire Bill of Rights, may 
paradoxically serve best to make the point.56 
Even so, while I think it entirely true that conscientious interpretation of 
the Constitution is often a more difficult task than the Roberts dictum implied, 
by no means does its problematic quality lead to a conclusion that failing any-
thing fairly passable as interpretation, courts must improvise meaning accord-
54. See J. ELY, supra note 23, at 191. 
55. E.g., id. at 87 ("The remainder of this chapter [actually, of the whole book] will 
comprise three arguments in favor of a participation-oriented, representation-reinforcing 
approach to judicial review.'). 
56. See, e.g., Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 
107 (1982). 
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ing to perceptions of some special role. The dilemma that is sketched that pro-
vides a legitimacy for courts to improvise a special role when interpretation 
fails is not what it seems to be. There is no such duty-at-large and, indeed, 
certainly no such imperative merely to decide every case on its merits. 
If the meaning of a clause cannot be established without recourse to meta 
constitutional appeals (or arguments of mere policy), that fact merely provides 
reason and straightforw·ard explanation of the judicial conclusion that the 
c;hallenged act of Congress cannot be said to fail to square ·with the constitu-
tional clause invoked by the litigant who relied upon it. If all that the litigant's 
own counsel has produced and all the outside scholarship that might be 
brought to bear on the question still leaves conscientious judges honestly un-
certain where "the constitutional line" lies, the uncertainty neither impairs 
nor delays performance of the judicial duty. Rather, the entire matter is at 
once resolved by a decision on the merits. The decision is that the litigant 
has failed to show that the act of Congress does not square ·with the clause 
that he or she sought to rely upon, and the challenge fails. The burden to 
show where the constitutional line lies is not with the Court. It is with the party 
who claims that the act of Congress does not square with that line. The Court's 
duty is to entertain the claim, to be attentive to it, to examine the litigant's 
basis for saying "the line lies here," and to see whether the statute squares 
once the litigant has established where the line is. 
So, for instance, the ninth amendment may not only be ambiguous on its 
face, but of no convincing pertinence even after one's best efforts to make much 
of it (though there is no reason, a priori, to take its futility for granted).51 
Similarly, the nature of the United States' obligation to guarantee to each state 
a "republican" form of government may present a similar difficulty (though, 
again, one ought not simply assume that it will).58 If, then, a state resists ap-
plication of an act of Congress on the claim that the act does not square with 
57. The suggestion that the ninth amendment's adjudicative futility ought not be as-
sumed in the absence of serious investigation is meant earnestly. Despite the criticism that has 
been made of Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (see, e.g., Grano, supra 
note 25, at 8·11), it may very well be an instance of a law which, as applied, was seriously 
subject to objection on ninth amendment grounds. The case involved a zoning ordinance 
applied to forbid a grandmother from sharing her own home with her own two grandsons; 
the ordinance was applied despite the utter lack of any evidence of crowding, interference with 
others, impact on property values, or any other distinction from any other family living to-
gether (as othenvise provided by the same ordinance) or, indeed, anything whatever that 
should plausibly be disturbing. The integrity of ordinary families, the historical centrality of 
close, consanguineal ties, the sense of duty and care of "one's own," the almost certain sense 
of profound impropriety that (I think) research would show would have greeted the mere 
suggestion of jailing an unoffending grandmother for sharing her home with her own 
grandchildren, and the extremely well-developed paths of pre-existing decisional law absorbing 
the presumed "right" to some positive sense of family, may well sum to a rare instance of a 
compelling ninth amendment case. The ninth amendment need not be seen as an empty 
sack simply from fear that unless one insists upon making it so, it must at once become every 
judicial moralist's cornucopia. The burden would appropriately be upon Mrs. Moore to es· 
tablish the foundations of her claim. In her case, however, it is likely that history would 
support her very well indeed. 
58. See, e.g., Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4: A Study in Constitu-
tional Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. REv. 513 (1962). 
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one or the other of these constitutional clauses, of course the state may fail-
not because of lazy or careless counsel, but because, in the end, the best that 
could be said was that the "line" representing either clause simply could not 
be established with sufficient clarity to permit a judgment that the act of 
Congress failed to square with that line. Nothing obliges the Court to im-
provise the line, to construct it, or to invent policies of its own which some line 
might serve. Indeed, nothing entitles the Court to do any of these things. The 
judicial duty is not less fitly performed because the party raising the challenge 
fails. Neither was the party raising the challenge necessarily inadequate in ex-
ploring the plausibility of certain interpretations. The material was not there; 
the clause was not helpful in the circumstances. The case is at an end. 
It may well be that some clauses are not merely intractable at their edges, 
but altogether intractable for litigant use. If so, it only goes to show, in a 
practical way, that such clauses have proved to be unserviceable in litigation 
before the Supreme Court. They need not, on that account alone, be thought 
of as unserviceable in legislative debate, unserviceable for executive use or 
unserviceable for each citizen·s own private uses.59 Rather, it may be merely an 
unshocking example of nonjusticiability in the concrete sense. In light of the 
issue before the Court, the best scholarship that the litigant could muster leaves 
the Court without sufficient basis to hold the challenged act of Congress as not 
squaring with the constitutional clause. Indeed, one might suggest that most 
allegedly "nonjusticiable" clauses are not nonjusticiable in the sense that they 
may not be a source of litigant reliance. Rather, they are nonjusticiable merely 
in the practical sense that every effort to invoke them as a means to avoid ap-
plication of an act of Congress has simply been unsuccessful: in a long list of 
litigants, none was able to show the location of the constitutional line repre-
sented by the clause sufficiently to enable conscientious judges to hold that the 
line represented by the act of Congress did not square.60 
Neither is there any trick or device to this treatment of the matter. To be 
sure, this description of judicial review does involve a methodological premise 
which is brought forward to resolve the putative dilemma, but the premise is 
neither unconventional nor strained. The premise is merely that when an act 
59. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), merely confirmed the separate 
obligation of the judiciary to determine the consistency of acts of Congress with provisions 
in the Constitution as an incident of adjudicating "cases" properly before the courts. Despite 
a few pretentious dicta in other cases (see, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1958)), 
there is no basis in Marbury or in any other source for the suggestion that the sole "correct" 
interpretation of the Constitution is that which is sufficiently convincing for courts to accept. 
See G. GuNTHER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW- CASES AND MATERIALS 25·30 (lOth ed. 1980); Brest, 
The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. REv. 585, 
589 (1975) ("Decisions not striking down Jaws do not always mean that the laws are constitu-
tional ... for a court's failure to invalidate may only reflect its institutional limitations.') 
(emphasis in original). 
60. The point is suggested in Justice Harlan's dictum that "[t]he suggestion that courts 
Jack standards by which to decide such cases . . . is relevant not only to the question of 
'justiciability,' but also, and perhaps more fundamentally, to the determination whether any 
cognizable constitutional claim has been asserted .... " Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 337 
(1962) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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of Congress othenvise applies to de&ne a party's rights, it is to be deemed 
controlling in the Supreme Court unless the litigant is able to show that, as 
applied, the act fails to square with some clause (or combination of clauses61) 
in the Constitution. The basis of the premise is more immediately the language 
of the supremacy clause in the Constitution itself: the clause makes an act of 
Congress the supreme law except insofar as not "pursuant" thereto. The burden 
of one who claims an act of Congress applies to another is to show that the act 
does so apply. If this demonstration cannot be made with the requisite clarity, 
that party fails. In tum, the burden of one who claims that an applicable act 
of Congress nonetheless fails because it does not square with the Constitution 
is to show that it does not square. If he cannot show what the clause means, he 
cannot show that the clause helps him and he fails. 
Neither does this answer to dissolve the alleged interpretive "dilemma" of 
the courts (i.e., the dilemma that allegedly compels the Court to improvise 
meanings for constitutional clauses) depend upon one's agreement with this 
particular methodological premise as a complete or as an exhaustive statement 
of the matter. One may very well observe that, depending on the nature of the 
challenge, sometimes the burden will be on the party who claims that the act 
of Congress does square. Such an instance would arise when the challenge is 
not on the basis that the applicable act of Congress is forbidden, but rather on 
the basis that it was not authorized. It notes that only such acts of Congress 
as the litigant relying upon them is able to show are "pursuant" to the 
Constitution, can be the basis of enforceable claims - enforceable by the 
government or by anyone else. Moreover, its burden-allocating premise is 
quite unexceptionable. The express phraseology in Article VI ("This Constitu-
tion and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land") straightfonvardly supports 
it. 
Indeed, a fuller and relatively complete description, appropriately allocating 
burdens in respect to constitutional litigation, will itself merely integrate 
these several observations. First, to the extent that the government or a private 
litigant claims that an act of Congress does apply to another in the manner 
alleged, the burden is appropriately the claimant's to show that that is the case. 
Second, one who claims that an applicable act of Congress nonetheless fails 
because it does not "square" with the Constitution, must indicate in what 
particular respect the act is alleged not to square. If it is alleged not to square 
because there is no obvious enumerated power or combination of powers 
sufficient to sustain the act in question, the burden appropriately becomes 
that of the party relying upon the act to show that, to the contrary, there is in 
fact ample authority to sustain it. On the other hand, if the objection is that the 
act fails not for want of original power to enact it, but rather because other 
61. The point of the reference to "some combination of clauses" is of course to 
acknowledge that there is an architecture in the Constitution. The crowding clauses ob-
viously bear upon one another, their particular grouping in particular articles likewise may 
have an illuminating significance, and indeed it may be useful to consider the "structure" of 
the Constitution as well as the relationships of its features in the course of quite standard 
and conscientious judicial review. See C. BLACK, supra note 39. 
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constitutional provisions disallow it, the burden of succeeding on that ob-
jection is equally clear; it is on the party who so asserts. 
Thus, in a particular case the dispute might involve an act of Congress 
that makes it a federal offense to cross a state line with the intention of inciting 
others to riot. That the statute applies to the alleged conduct of the accused is 
for the government to show. Should the act not be challenged as inapplicable, 
but rather as beyond the constitutional competence of Congress, the obligation 
is again upon the government- to show that the act was within the authority 
of Congress to enact. Possibly the government may rely upon the commerce 
clause (the power to "regulate commerce among the several states"), coupled 
with the famous sweeping clause (i.e., the "necessary and proper" clause), but 
in any event the burden is the government's to discharge however easily others 
may think it can be carried. Separately, however, the party to whom the statute 
is being applied may object that insofar as the statute means to criminalize 
interstate travel when undertaken for the purpose of orally inciting certain 
action by others, it is forbidden by the first amendment; i.e., it is an Act of 
Congress abridging the freedom of speech, forbidden by that clause which says 
that "Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech." The 
burden is, of course, upon the defendant to establish that the statute does not 
"square" with this constitutional provision, and correspondingly to show how 
this provision fits his case. In this instance, however, that burden may rest 
upon him quite lightly in the first instance, for the language of the clause 
itself may seem at once to address this case and the government may be ap-
propriately pressed to overcome the weight of the prima facie case.62 
Whatever one makes of these matters, they come to the same point. The 
Supreme Court is not bound at all costs to invent some meaning for every 
word and clause in the Constitution. It is, rather, to measure the adequacy of 
that meaning or that interpretation tendered by some party to the litigation, 
insofar as that tendered meaning or interpretation is relied upon to show how 
an act of Congress does, or does not "square." Correspondingly, arguments of 
constitutional meta interpretation that range beyond the assembly of materials 
from which reasonable interpretations of constitutional clauses can be derived 
are of no necessity whatever. Indeed, they are of no propriety. Noninterpreting 
the only Constitution we are in fact expounding, namely this Constitution, 
whether because one is disgruntled with its limited wisdom or because some 
provisions are genuinely intractable, is not an impressive enterprise. 
v 
My consideration of how various judges and academics arrived at a number 
of specific answers quite satisfactory to themselves, although emphatically less 
so to others, was prompted by an attempt to examine several practical un-
certainties of the first amendment.63 In nearly each such instance, it happened 
62. "[T]he specific prohibitions of the first ten amendments and the same prohibitions 
when adopted by the Fourteenth Amendment leave no opportunity for presumption of con-
stitutionality where statutes on their face violate the prohibition." Letter from Justice Stone 
to Chief Justice Hughes, Apr. 19, 1938, quoted in Lusky, supra note 23, at 1098. 
63. This lecture is an adaptation of what will be Foreword for a brief work on INTERPRE-
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that the difference in satisfactoriness was achieved by altogether subordinating 
(if not utterly dismissing) the first amendment and by superordinating some 
exceptional theory of judicial review. In brief, the recurring suggestion was that 
the "right" answer to any vexing case arising under the first amendment (or 
any other clause) is essentially a function of the "right" theory of what courts 
should and should not do. Decide what courts should do and it will then be 
obvious how the Constitution should be deemed to apply: it applies in what-
ever fashion as best fits what courts should do. On the foundations of that 
truism, neo-creationists continue to reinvent the Supreme Court in their pre-
ferred image, principally as a means to reinvent the Constitution to their pre-
ferred ends. G~ 
Despite the problems of an aged Constitution, one advantage of having a 
substantial history is that we may occasionally stand off from it and see what 
we think it has produced. We have now seen the production of an amazing 
variety of nonstandard theories of judicial review. They range from variations 
on (a)- the Supreme Court should regard nearly all constitutional questions 
as unwelcome and either decline to review them or failing that, uphold all of 
the laws that it can, to variations on (z) - the Court should engage every dis-
pute that even vaguely resembles a law suit to the end of enacting its own views 
of justice. The intermediate permutations of nonstandard theory are numerous 
and ingenious. They virtually exhaust the letters of the alphabet. 
This lecture has dealt incompletely with many particular special theories. 
For that matter, it is not even a full-dress, measured review of any one non-
standard theory. But the sheer gravity of the continuing discourse over such 
matters, much of which is very ably discussed by other, seems still to have left 
something out of account. Thus the point of this lecture is at once smaller and 
larger than one will find reflected in the patient and even brilliant but ad hoc 
pieces of special theory advocacy. It is to suggest that less has been accomplished 
than meets the eye. It is also to suggest that the continuing pursuit of non-
standard theories does not now seem as promising as it once did, as an aid to 
resolving the problematic quality of constitutional law. Neither does it appear 
to be as useful as it once seemed, as a way out of uncertainty and of professional 
discontent. Nearly all of it requires, moreover, some degree of playing very 
loosely with the remembrance that it is merely this Constitution that is being 
expounded. Principally for these several reasons, I think the historic quest to 
fashion nonstandard theories of judicial review in constitutional cases has 
pretty much run its course. 
Yet, having reflected rather testily on why the professional tendency to press 
various nonstandard theories of judicial review does not appear impressive after 
TATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT. As a Foreword, its purpose will be to explain why the 
ensuing chapters of the book will reflect no effort to resolve difficulties presented by cases 
arising under the first amendment by recourse to any nonstandard theory of judicial review. 
In brief, no first amendment issue would be "decided" by falling back upon some deus ex 
machina that pleads to some special theory of judicial review. Not because no such theory is 
available (plainly untrue) or because "none works," but because each requires too much 
suspension of one's own grounds for disbelief. 
64. The :t:qost recent prolix prolegomenon of this sort is elegantly represented in Unger, 
The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HAilv. L. REv. 561 (1983). 
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all, one need not simply leave the matter at that. It remains to be said that 
even if one cannot be won over to the particular rather automatic fashion in 
which one or another special theory of judicial review tends to "resolve" 
constitutional cases, one need not on that account lapse into a general pro-
fessional moroseness about the condition or the liveliness of constitutional law. 
Indeed, it may occur to one that in certain respects it may well be the advocates 
of nonstandard theories, rather than their critics, who have been prematurely 
pessimistic about the value of taking this Constitution seriously. 
Ordinary judicial conscientiousness in respect to interpretations of our 
Constitution cuts both ways. It certainly does mean that the boundaries are to 
be respected, but there is no reason to take this as counsel of despair. The words 
of the Constitution are instructive. They do impose constraints, equally upon 
courts as upon other agencies of government. Yet one's own reading ought 
not be dose-minded nor premature. History, moreover, is germane in more 
than a confining way. Quite frequently, what it yields is heavily dependent 
upon the premises of its users- which may be far too narrow or wizened,65 
rather than too wishful. More often than one might suppose, one may be sur-
prised that what was first thought doubtful in respect to the manner in which 
a given clause or combination of clauses might be applicable to a particular 
case, is not such a puzzle after all. One may be surprised that an imperfect, 
brief, and aged document, even absent those amendments one thinks would 
significantly improve it, can still speak usefully to our condition, without need 
to strain its provisions; yet I think it still does.66 
65. See, e.g., R. BERGER, GovERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977). For significantly more percep-
tive treatments of the same historical materials, see A. BICKEL, supra note 12, at 102-04; J. 
ELY, supra note 23, at 22-30, 198-~~01; Bickel, The 01·iginal Understanding and the Segregation 
Decision, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1955); Curtis, Further Adventures of the Nine Lived Cat: A Re-
sponse to Mr. Berger on Incorporation of the Bill of Rights, 42 OHio ST. L.J. 89 (1982); Curtis, 
The Bill of Rights as a Limitation on State Authority: A Reply to Professor Berger, 16 WAKE 
FoREST L. REv. 45 (1980); Dimond, Strict Construction and judicial Review of Racial Dis-
crimination Under the Equal Protection Clause: Meeting Raoul Berger on Interpretivist 
Grounds, 80 MicH. L. REv. 462 (1982); Graham, Our "Declaratory" Fourteenth, 7 STAN. L. 
REV. 1 (1955); Murphy, Constitutional Interpretation: The Art of the Historian, Magician, or 
Statesman?, 87 YALE L.J. 1752 (1978). See also materials collected in C. ANTIEAU, THE ORIGINAL 
UNDERSTANDING OF THE FOURTEEr-;TH AMENDMENT (1981); H. FLACK, THE ADoPTION OF THE 
FouRTEENTH AMENDMENT (1908); J. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
(1956); Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth Amendment, the "Right" to Vote, and the Understand-
ing of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965 SuP. CT. REv. 33. 
An ironic effect of nco-cynicism in the uses of constitutional history is the manner in which 
it furnishes argumentative fuel for "noninterpretivists." For example, a substantial portion 
of Michael Perry's justification for superimposing a separate moral philosophy on the 
fourteenth amendment is based on the threat that unless the reader is prepared to treat the 
fourteenth amendment in this (noninterpretivist) fashion, the reader will be compelled to 
accept the morally-dreadful consequences of Mr. Berger's "history." Instrumentally, such 
authors may have a stake in agreeing with the bleaker reconstruction of history for the purpose 
of persuading one that history is therefore intolerable as an acceptable source of constitutional 
law. See M. PERRY, supra note 25, at 91 ("[u]nless there is a justification ..• for noninterpre-
tive review in human rights cases, virtually all of the constitutional doctrine regarding human 
rights fashioned by the Supreme Court in this century must be adjudged illegitimate .••• ") 
(emphasis added). For a similar example, see also Tushnet, supra note 27, at 781. 
66. And to the extent that it may not, the means of legitimate fundimental change are 
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If one works away at these matters more straightforwardly, moreover, one 
may well be inclined to think back and wonder why there has been such an 
enormous amount of peculiar energy expended on efforts to battle in behalf of 
special theories of judicial review. Moderation leaves quite enough for reason-
able people to think about, without the anxiety that the Constitution is subject 
to capture by devices of special pleading. Give the document its due, and do 
not fear so much for the rest. 
still at hand. It is by amendment that a Constitution records a nation's fundamental changes 
as an act of will, actively and positively, an observation that cannot be made of such trans-
figurations merely perpetrated by unimpeached and "not overruled" judges on the skeleton 
of an inadequate document. By way of concrete example, it seems to me clear enough that 
the amendments of 1791, and those also of 1866-1870, made our Constitution better by far 
than what it was without those alterations. So, too, in this respect is it better by far were 
those alterations not in the Constitution itself, but merely discoverable in the Shepardized 
inventions of judges. So, as well, with equal matters of fundamental concern today. It is one 
of the ironies of judicial self-justification that it operates to inhibit the nation's authentic 
means of making improvements in the Constitution by (a) "proving" that amendments are 
not needed and by (b) "proving" also that (given the special theories of some judges) none 
of any significance can safely even be considered. 
